

POLI 790: Positive Political Theory

Fall 2008

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Office Hours: Monday 4-5pm, Thursday 2-3pm

COURSE OVERVIEW

This seminar is designed to introduce graduate students to rational choice theories as they are used in political science. Although the seminar presupposes some familiarity with game theory, its focus is not to impart the tools of rational choice analysis, but to develop a thorough intuitive understanding of the logic of rational choice accounts and the theoretical and empirical issues that such accounts raise. We will survey applications of rational choice models across the subfields of the discipline as well as in specific issue areas, consider critiques of rational choice approaches, and close by considering some alternative theoretical approaches to modeling human behavior.

READINGS

The readings for this class consist largely of book chapters and papers. Many of the papers are available electronically, and direct links to them are available from this website (You may have to configure your browser to make use of the UNC proxy server if you are accessing papers from off-campus. [Click here](#) for instructions on how to do this.) Photocopies of readings that are not electronically available will be placed in the bin outside my door. Please do not remove these readings from Hamilton and return them quickly to the appropriate folder so that other students can make use of them. For each week, the readings listed directly underneath the heading are

required. Readings preceded by bullets provide a (limited) list of additional readings on each topic and are not required.

GRADES AND EVALUATION

This is a graduate seminar. This means that class will be conducted in a colloquium style. Because of this format, it is absolutely essential that every student has completed all of the assigned reading before class and is ready to participate in discussion. Your active and thoughtful participation is the key to making this seminar a success, and I will not tolerate free-riding. (Obviously, you should not miss class unless there are exceptional circumstances that keep you from being there – and then you’ll have to convince me that the circumstances are truly extraordinary. Remember that I am by nature skeptical.) Beginning in week 4, two students will be responsible for leading discussion each week. We will “distribute” weeks during the first meeting. When you are leading discussion, you must prepare a short summary of the readings (a paragraph or two per reading) and a list of discussion questions. You should e-mail both to me no later than Sunday evening before class.

In addition to participating in and leading class discussion, students must complete two types of written assignments:

1. Between weeks 4 and 16, you must write two (2) reaction papers (ca. 5 pages) on the readings for a particular week. You can choose the particular weeks on which you would like to write. Papers should provide a clear synopsis of the argument in each of the readings, compare and contrast the readings, and evaluate them critically (e.g., What are the problems/research questions addressed? How do the authors address this question? What are the main findings? How do the papers speak to one another? Which arguments do you find convincing? What are the weak parts of the arguments? What questions do the readings leave open?). Essays are due at the beginning of the following class (e.g., if you write on the readings for week 5, your essay is due at the beginning of class for week 6).
2. Over the course of the semester, you must develop a literature review/research proposal that is relevant to the material covered in this class. Begin by looking for a substantive area of research of interest to you in which rational choice approaches have been used. Identify an open research question in that area. Your task is to develop a research proposal that 1) outlines this research question, 2) clearly summarizes the relevant

literature and its development over time (formal and non-formal approaches), including a discussion of the contributions and limitations of rational choice approaches in this area, 3) explains how your research question fits into this literature, and 4) sketches your answer to the question. This sketch should include a clear statement of the theoretical argument as well as an outline of the empirical strategy to be used to test the theoretical argument. A short, one page description of the research question is due on October 13.

Assignments that are not turned in on time will receive a penalty. The following weights will be used to determine course grades:

Discussion Leadership and Participation: 35%

Reaction Papers: 30%

Research Proposal: 35%

ACADEMIC DISHONESTY:

Students and faculty at UNC are governed by the Honor Code, and academic dishonesty will not be tolerated. Any student who is caught attempting to represent someone else's work as their own or to cheat in any other manner will be subject to university discipline under the Honor Code. If you have any questions regarding this policy, you can refer to the University Code of Conduct [by clicking here](#).

STUDENTS WITH CHALLENGES

Students with challenges who require individualized testing or other accommodations should identify themselves and express their needs during the first week of the semester. Where the challenge is not immediately apparent, verification will be required.

(TENTATIVE) SEMESTER SCHEDULE

WEEK 1 (8/18): PHILOSOPHICAL FOUNDATIONS

1. [1. Daniel Little. 1991. Varieties of Social Explanation: An Introduction to the Philosophy of Science. Boulder: Westview Press. \[Chapters 1, 2, and 9\]](#)
2. [2. Karl Popper. 1985. "The Rationality Principle." In David Miller ed. Popper Selections. Princeton: Princeton University Press.](#)
3. [3. John Harsanyi. 1990. "Advances in Understanding Human Behavior." In Paul Moser \(ed.\) Rationality in Action. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.](#)

WEEK 2 (8/25) GAME THEORY REVIEW

1. [1. Robert Gibbons. 1997. "An Introduction to Applicable Game Theory," Journal of Economic Perspectives 11:127-149.](#)
2. [2. Rubinstein. 1991. "Comments on the Interpretation of Game Theory," Econometrica 59:909-24.](#)
3. [3. Faruk Gul. 1997. "A Nobel Prize for Game Theorists: The Contributions of Harsanyi, Nash, and Selten." Journal of Economic Perspectives 11: 159-174.](#)

Recommended:

1. •David Kreps. 1990. Game Theory and Economic Modeling. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

2. •Roger Myerson. 1992. "On the Value of Game Theory in Social Science," *Rationality and Society* 4:62-73.
3. •Martin Osborne. 2003. *An Introduction to Game Theory*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

WEEK 3 (9/1): – NO CLASS (Labor Day)

WEEK 4 (9/8): SOCIAL CHOICE THEORY

1. 1. [Kenneth Arrow. 1983. "Values and Collective Decision-Making." In Ken Arrow. *Social Choice and Justice*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.](#)
2. 2. [Amartya Sen \(1995\). "Rationality and Social Choice." *American Economic Review* 85: 1-24.](#)
3. 3. [James Buchanan. 1954. "Social Choice, Democracy, and Free Markets." *The Journal of Political Economy* 62: 114-23.](#)
4. 4. [William Riker. 1982. *Liberalism Against Populism*. Prospect Heights: Waveland Press. Chapter 1.](#)

WEEK 5 (9/15): THE VETO PLAYER MODEL

1. [1. Charles Cameron. 2000. Veto Bargaining: Presidents and the Politics of Negative Power. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. \[Chapters 3 and 4.\]](#)
2. [2. Tim Groseclose and Nolan McCarty. 2001. "The Politics of Blame: Bargaining Before an Audience." American Journal of Political Science 45: 100-119.](#)
3. [3. Kathleen Bawn. 1999. "Money and Majorities in the Federal Republic of Germany: Evidence for a Veto Players Model of Government Spending." American Journal of Political Science 43: 707-736.](#)

Recommended:

1. •Alison Alter. 2002. "Minimizing the Risks of Delegation: Multiple Referral in the German Bundesrat." American Journal of Political Science 46: 299-315
2. •Nolan McCarty. 2000. "Proposal Rights, Veto Rights, and Political Bargaining." American Journal of Political Science 44: 506-522.
3. •Thomas Romer and Howard Rosenthal. 1978. "Political Resource Allocation, Controlled Agendas, and the Status Quo." Public Choice 33:27-44.
4. •George Tsebelis. 2002. Veto Players. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

WEEK 6 (9/22): LEGISLATIVE INSTITUTIONS

1. [1. Keith Krehbiel. 1988. "Spatial Models of Legislative Choice," Legislative Studies Quarterly 8:259-269 \[Pages 259-282 only\].](#)
2. [2. Kenneth Shepsle and Barry Weingast. 1987. "The Institutional Foundations of Committee Power," American Political Science Review 81:85-104.](#)
3. [3. Thomas Gilligan and Keith Krehbiel. 1990. "Organization of Informative Committees by a Rational Legislature," American Journal of Political Science 34:531-64.](#)

Recommended:

1. •David Baron. 2000. "Legislative Organization with Informative Committees." *American Journal of Political Science* 44:485-505.
2. •David Baron. 1989. "A Noncooperative Theory of Legislative Institutions." *American Journal of Political Science* 33: 1048-1084.
3. •Gary Cox and Matthew McCubbins. 2005. *Setting the Agenda*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
4. •Daniel Diermeier and Roger Myerson. 1999. "Bicameralism and its Consequences for the Internal Organization of Legislatures." *American Economic Review* 89: 1182-1196.
5. •Daniel Diermeier. 1995. "Commitment, Deference, and Legislative Institutions." *American Political Science Review* 89: 344-355.
6. •Keith Krehbiel, Kenneth Shepsle and Barry Weingast. 1987. "Controversy: Why are Congressional Committees Powerful?" *American Political Science Review* 81:929-45.
7. •Keith Krehbiel. 1996. "Institutional and Partisan Sources of Gridlock: A Theory of Divided and Unified Government." *Journal of Theoretical Politics* 8: 7-40.
8. •Keith Krehbiel. 1988. "Spatial Models of Legislative Choice," *Legislative Studies Quarterly* 8:259-269.
9. •Keith Krehbiel. 1998. *Pivotal Politics*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
10. •William Riker. 1980. "Implications from the Disequilibrium of Majority Rule for the Study of Institutions." *American Political Science Review* 74: 432-446.
11. •Kenneth Shepsle. 1979. "Institutional Arrangements and Equilibrium in Multidimensional Voting Models." *American Journal of Political Science* 23:27-60.
12. •Barry Weingast and William Marshall. 1988. "The Industrial Organization of Congress," *Journal of Political Economy* 96:132-163.

WEEK 7 (9/29): LEGISLATIVE BARGAINING

1. [1. David Baron and John Ferejohn. 1989. "Bargaining in Legislatures." *American Political Science Review* 83: 1181-1206.](#)
2. 2. Tim Groseclose and James Snyder. 1996. "Buying Supermajorities." *American Political Science Review* 90: 303-315.

Recommended:

1. •David Austen-Smith and Jeffrey Banks. 1988. "Elections, Coalitions, and Legislative Outcomes." *American Political Science Review* 82: 405-22.
2. •Jeffrey Banks. 2000. "Buying Supermajorities in Finite Legislatures." *American Political Science Review* 94: 677-681.
3. •Tim Groseclose and James Snyder. 2000. "Vote Buying, Supermajorities, and Flooded Coalitions." *American Political Science Review* 94: 683-684.

WEEK 8 (10/6): PARLIAMENTARY GOVERNMENT

1. [1. John Huber. 1996. "The Vote of Confidence in Parliamentary Democracies," *American Political Science Review* 90:269-82.](#)
2. [2. Michael Laver and Kenneth Shepsle. 1996. *Making and Breaking Governments*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. \[Chapters 1,2, 4\].](#)
3. [3. Lanny Martin and Georg Vanberg. 2005. "Coalition Policymaking and Legislative Review." *American Political Science Review* 99: 93-106.](#)

Recommended:

1. •David Baron. 1991. "A Spatial Bargaining Theory of Government Formation in Parliamentary Systems." *American Political Science Review* 85: 137-164.
2. •David Baron. 1993. "Government Formation and Endogenous Parties." *American Political Science Review* 87: 34-47.

3. •David Baron. 1998. "Comparative Dynamics of Parliamentary Governments." *American Political Science Review* 92: 593-609.
4. •Cliff Carrubba and Craig Volden. 2000. "Coalitional Politics and Logrolling in Legislative Institutions." *American Journal of Political Science* 44: 261-277
5. •Christopher Crombez. 1996. "Minority governments, minimal winning coalitions and surplus majorities in parliamentary systems." *European Journal of Political Research* 29: 1-29.
6. •Daniel Diermeier and Randy Stevenson. 2000. "Cabinet Termination and Critical Events." *American Political Science Review* 94: 627-640.
7. •Daniel Diermeier and Timothy Feddersen. 1998. "Cohesion in Legislatures and the Vote of Confidence Procedure." *American Political Science Review* 92: 611-621.
8. •William B. Heller. 2001. "Making Policy Stick: Why the Government Gets What It Wants in Multiparty Parliaments." *American Journal of Political Science* 45: 780-798.
9. •John Huber. 1992. "Restrictive Legislative Procedures in France and the United States," *American Political Science Review* 86:675-87.
10. •John Huber and Nolan McCarty. 2001. "Cabinet Decision Rules and Political Uncertainty in Parliamentary Democracies," *American Political Science Review* 95: 345-61.
11. •John Huber and Arthur Lupia. 2001. "Cabinet Instability and Delegation in Parliamentary Democracies." *American Journal of Political Science* 45: 18-32.
12. •Michael Laver and Kenneth Shepsle. 1990. "Coalitions and Cabinet Governments," *American Political Science Review* 84:873-90.
13. •Lanny Martin and Georg Vanberg. 2004. "Policing the Bargain: Coalition Government and Parliamentary Scrutiny." *American Journal of Political Science* 48: 13-27.
14. •Lanny Martin and Randy Stevenson. 2001. "Government Formation in Parliamentary Democracies." *American Journal of Political Science* 45: 33-50.
15. •Michael Thies. 2001. "Keeping Tabs on Partners: The Logic of Delegation in Coalition Governments." *American Journal of Political Science* 45: 580-598.
16. •George Tsebelis. 1994. "The Power of the European Parliament as a Conditional Agenda Setter," *American Political Science Review* 88:128-142.

WEEK 9 (10/13): ELECTORAL COMPETITION AND VOTING

1. 1. [Martin Osborne. 1995. "Spatial Models of Competition Under Plurality Rule: A Survey of Some Explanations of the Number of Candidates and the Positions They Take." *Canadian Journal of Economics* 28:261-301.](#)

2. [2. John Duffy and Margit Tavits. 2008. "Beliefs and Voting Decisions: A Test of the Pivotal Voter Model." American Journal of Political Science 52: 603-618.](#)
3. [3. Amrita Dhillon and Susana Peralta. 2002. "Economic Theories of Voter Turnout." Economic Journal 112: F332-F352.](#)

Recommended:

1. •Michael Alvarez and Jonathan Nagler. 2000. "A New Approach for Modeling Strategic Voting in Multiparty Elections." *British Journal of Political Science* 30: 57-75.
2. •David Austen-Smith. 1987. "Sophisticated Sincerity: Voting Over Endogenous Agendas." *American Political Science Review* 81: 1323-1330.
3. •Kathleen Bawn. 2000. "Voter Responses to Electoral Complexity: Ticket Splitting, Rational Voters, and Representation in the Federal Republic of Germany." *British Journal of Political Science* 29: 487-505.
4. •Bruce Cain, John Ferejohn, and Morris Fiorina. 1987. *The Personal Vote: Constituency Service and Electoral Independence*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
5. •Randall Calvert and Richard Fenno. 1994. "Strategy and Sophisticated Voting in the Senate." *Journal of Politics*. 56: 349-376.
6. •Gary Cox. 1990. "Centripetal and Centrifugal Incentives in Electoral Systems." *American Journal of Political Science* 34: 903-935.
7. •Gary Cox. 1994. "Strategic Voting Equilibria under the Single Nontransferable Vote." *American Political Science Review* 88:608-621.
8. •Gary Cox. 1997. *Making Votes Count: Strategic Coordination in the World's Electoral Systems*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
9. •Arthur Denzau and Robert MacKay. 1983. "Gatekeeping and Monopoly Power of Committees: An Analysis of Sincere and Sophisticated Behavior." *American Journal of Political Science* 27: 740-762.
10. •Anthony Downs. 1957. *An Economic Theory of Democracy*.
11. •Robin Farquharson. 1969. *Theory of Voting*. New Haven: Yale University Press.
12. •Timothy Feddersen and Wolfgang Pesendorfer. 1996. "The Swing Voter's Curse." *American Economic Review* 86: 408-24.
13. •Timothy J. Feddersen, "A Voting Model Implying Duverger's Law and Positive Turnout." *American Journal of Political Science* Vol. 36 No. 4. (Nov., 1992), pp. 938-962.
14. •Timothy Feddersen and Wolfgang Pesendorfer. 1998. "Convicting the Innocent: The Inferiority of Unanimous Jury Verdicts under Strategic Voting." *American Economic Review* 86: 408-24.

15. •Mark Fey. 1997. "Stability and Coordination in Duverger's Law: A Formal Model of Preelection Polls and Strategic Voting." *American Political Science Review* 91: 135-147. Thomas Palfrey and Howard Rosenthal. 1985. "Voter Participation and Strategic Uncertainty." *American Political Science Review*. 79: 62-78.
16. •Richard McKelvey and Richard Niemi. 1978. "A Multistage Game Representation of Sophisticated Voting for Binary Procedures." *Journal of Economic Theory* 18:1-22.
17. •Ken Shepsle and Barry Weingast. 1984. "Uncovered Sets and Sophisticated Voting Outcomes with Implications for Agenda Institutions." *American Journal of Political Science* 28: 49-74.
18. •Craig Volden. 1998. "Sophisticated Voting in Supermajoritarian Settings." *Journal of Politics* 60: 149-173.

WEEK 10 (10/20): DELEGATION AND BUREAUCRACY

1. [1. David Epstein and Sharyn O'Halloran. 1996. "Divided Government and the Design of Administrative Procedures: A Formal Model and Empirical Test." *The Journal of Politics* 58: 373-397.](#)
2. [2. Craig Volden. 2002. "A Formal Model of the Politics of Delegation in a Separation of Powers System." *American Journal of Political Science* 46: 111-133.](#)
3. [3. John Huber and Charles Shipan. 2002. *Deliberate Discretion*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. \[Chapter 4.\]](#)
4. [4. Jonathan Bendor, Amihai Glazer, and Thomas Hammond. 2001. "Theories of Delegation." *Annual Review of Political Science* 4: 234-269.](#)

Recommended:

1. •Kathleen Bawn. 1995. "Political Control Versus Expertise: Congressional Choices About Administrative Procedures." *American Political Science Review* 89: 62-73.

2. •Jonathan Bendor and Adam Meirowitz. 2004. "Spatial Models of Delegation." *American Political Science Review* 98: 293-310.
3. •John Huber and Nolan McCarty. 2004. "Bureaucratic Capacity, Delegation, and Political Reform." *American Political Science Review* 98: 481-494.
4. •David Epstein and Sharyn O'Halloran. 1999. *Delegating Powers*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
5. •Matthew McCubbins, Roger Noll, and Barry Weingast. 1987. "Administrative Procedures as Instruments of Political Control." *Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization* 3: 243-277.
6. •Matthew McCubbins, Roger Noll, and Barry Weingast. 1989. "Structure and Process, Politics and Policy: Administrative Arrangements and the Political Control of Agencies." *Virginia Law Review* 75: 431-482.
7. •Charles Shipan. 2004. "Regulatory Regimes, Agency Actions, and the Conditional Nature of Congressional Influence." *American Political Science Review* 98: 467-480.

WEEK 11 (10/27): JUDICIAL POLITICS

ONE-PAGE SUMMARY OF RESEARCH PROPOSAL DUE

1. [1. Matthew Stephenson. 2003. "When the Devil Turns...: The Political Foundations of Independent Judicial Review." *Journal of Legal Studies* 32: 59-90.](#)
2. [2. Jeffrey Lax and Charles Cameron. 2007. "Bargaining and Opinion Assignment on the US Supreme Court." *Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization* 23: 276-302.](#)
3. [3. Jeffrey Staton and Georg Vanberg. 2008. "Delegation, Defiance, and Judicial Opinions." *American Journal of Political Science*. 52: 504-519.](#)

Recommended:

1. •Ethan Bueno de Mesquita and Matthew Stephenson. 2002. "Informative Precedent and Intrajudicial Communication." *American Political Science Review* 96: 755-766.
2. •Greg Caldeira, John R. Wright, and Christopher Zorn. 1999. "Strategic Voting and Gatekeeping in the Supreme Court." *Journal of Law, Economics and Organization* 15: 549-72.
3. •Charles Cameron, Jeffrey Segal, and Donald Songer. 2000. "Strategic Auditing in a Political Hierarchy: An Informational Model of the Supreme Court's Certiorari Decisions." *American Political Science Review* 94: 101-116.
4. •Cliff Carrubba and James Rogers. 2003. "National Judicial Power and the Dormant Commerce Clause." *Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization* 19: 543-70.
5. •Lee Epstein and Jack Knight. 1996. "On the Struggle for Judicial Supremacy." *Law and Society Review* 30:87-120.
6. •Lee Epstein and Jack Knight. 1998. *The Choices Justices Make*. Washington DC: CQ Press.
7. •John Ferejohn and Charles Shipan. 1990. "Congressional Influence on Bureaucracy." *Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization* 6:1-27.
8. •John Ferejohn and Barry Weingast. 1992. "A Positive Theory of Statutory Interpretation." *International Review of Law and Economics* 12: 263-79.
9. •Rafael Gely and Pablo Spiller. 1990. "A Rational Choice Theory of Supreme Court Statutory Decisions with Applications to the State Farm and Grove City Cases." *Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization* 6: 263-300.
10. •Thomas Hammond, Chris Bonneau, and Reginald Sheehan. 2006. *Strategic Behavior and Policy Choice on the US Supreme Court*. Stanford University Press.
11. •Gretchen Helmke. 2005. *Courts under Constraints: Judges, Generals, and Presidents in Argentina*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
12. •Walter Murphy. 1964. *The Elements of Judicial Strategy*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
13. •James Rogers. 2001. "Information and Judicial Review: A Signaling Model of Legislative-Judicial Interaction." *American Journal of Political Science* 45: 84-99.
14. •James Rogers and Georg Vanberg. 2002. "Judicial Advisory Opinions and Legislative Outcomes in Comparative Perspective." *American Journal of Political Science* 46: 379-397.
15. •Jeffrey Segal. 1997. "Separation of Powers Games in the Positive Theory of Congress and the Courts." *American Political Science Review* 91: 28-44.
16. •Charles Shipan. 2000. "The Legislative Design of Judicial Review: A Formal Analysis." *Journal of Theoretical Politics* 12: 269-304.
17. •Jeffrey Staton. 2006. "Constitutional Review and the Selective Promotion of Case Results." *American Journal of Political Science* 50: 98-112.
18. •Matthew Stephenson. 2004. "The Court of Public Opinion: Government Accountability and Judicial Power." *Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization*. 20: 379-399.
19. •Georg Vanberg. 1998. "Abstract Judicial Review, Legislative Bargaining, and Policy Compromise." *Journal of Theoretical Politics* 10: 299-326.
20. •Georg Vanberg. 2005. *The Politics of Constitutional Review in Germany*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

WEEK 12 (11/3): INTERNATIONAL CONFLICT

1. [1. Fearon, James D. 1995. "Rationalist Explanations for War." International Organization. 49: 379-414.](#)
2. Bahar Leventoglu and Branislav Slantchev. 2007. "The Armed Peace: A Punctuated Equilibrium Theory of War." *American Journal of Political Science*. 51: 755-771.
3. [3. Bruce Bueno de Mesquita, James Morrow, Randolph Silverson, and Alastair Smith. 1999. "An Institutional Explanation of the Democratic Peace." American Political Science Review 93:791-808.](#)
4. Stephen Gent. 2007. "Strange Bedfellows: The Strategic Dynamics of Major Power Military Interventions." *Journal of Politics* 69

Recommended:

1. •Fearon, James D. 1994. "Signaling Versus the Balance of Power and Interests." *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 38: 236-269.
2. •Paul Huth and Bruce Russett. 1984. "What Makes Deterrence Work: Cases from 1900 to 1980." *World Politics* 36: 496-526.
3. •Brett Ashley Leeds. 1999. "Domestic Political Institutions, Credible Commitments, and International Cooperation." *American Journal of Political Science* 43:979-1002.
4. •Robert Powell. 1991. "Guns, Butter, and Anarchy." *American Political Science Review* 87: 115-132.
5. •William Reed. 2003. "Information, Power, and War." *American Political Science Review* 97: 633-641.
6. •Kenneth Schultz. 1999. "Do Democratic Institutions Constrain or Inform? Contrasting Two Institutional Perspectives on Democracy and War." *International Organization* 53:233-266.
7. •Branislav Slantchev. 2003. "The Principle of Convergence in Wartime Negotiations." *American Political Science Review* 97: 621-632.

8. •Curt Signorino. 1999. "Strategic Interaction and the Statistical Analysis of International Conflict." *American Political Science Review* 93:279-297.

WEEK 13 (11/10): PROBLEMS OF COLLECTIVE ACTION

1. 1.Elinor Ostrom, James Walker, and Roy Gardner. 1992. "Covenants With and Without a Sword: Self-Governance is Possible." *American Political Science Review* 86: 404-417.
2. 2.Elinor Ostrom. 1998. "A Behavioral Approach to the Rational Choice Theory of Collective Action." *American Political Science Review* 92: 1-22.
3. 3.Randall Calvert. 1992. "Leadership and Its Basis in Problems of Social Coordination." *International Political Science Review* 13: 7-24
4. 4.[Suzanne Lohmann. 1994. "The Dynamics of Informational Cascades: The Monday Demonstrations in Leipzig, East Germany, 1989-91." *World Politics* 47:42-101.](#)

Recommended:

1. •Rasma Karklins and Roger Petersen. 1993. "Decision Calculus of Protestors and Regimes." *Journal of Politics* 55:588-615.
2. •[Timur Kuran. 1991. "Now Out of Never: The Element of Surprise in the East European Revolution of 1989." *World Politics* 44: 7-48.](#)
3. •[David Laitin. 1994. "The Tower of Babel as a Coordination Game." *American Political Science Review* 88:622-34.](#)
4. •Mancur Olson. 1965. *The Logic of Collective Action*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
5. •Elinor Ostrom. 1990. *Governing the Commons*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

WEEK 14 (11/17): INSTITUTIONS AS EQUILIBRIA

1. [1. Randall Calvert. 1995. "The Rational Choice Theory of Social Institutions." In Modern Political Economy ed. J. Banks and E. Hanushek. \(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press\).](#)
2. [2. Randall Calvert. 1995. "Rational Actors, Equilibrium and Social Institutions." In Jack Knight and Itai Sened \(eds.\) Explaining Social Institutions. \(Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press\).](#)
3. [3. Gordon Tullock. 1972/2004. "The Edge of the Jungle." In Gordon Tullock. Virginia Political Economy. Indianapolis: Liberty Fund.](#)
4. [4. Douglass North. 1991. "Institutions." Journal of Economic Perspectives. 5: 97-112.](#)

Recommended:

1. •Robert Axelrod. 1984. The Evolution of Cooperation. New York: Basic Books.
2. •Rui J.P. de Figueiredo. 2002. "Electoral Competition, Political Uncertainty, and Policy Insulation." American Political Science Review 96: 321-334.
3. •Avner Greif. 1994. "Cultural Beliefs and the Organization of Society," Journal of Political Economy 102:912-50.
4. •Russell Hardin. 1989. "Why a Constitution?" in Grofman and Wittman (eds.). The Federalist Papers and the New Institutionalism. New York: Agathon Press.
5. •Jack Knight. 1995. "Models, Interpretations and Theories: Constructing Explanations of Institutional Emergence and Change." In Jack Knight and Itai Sened (eds.) Explaining Social Institutions ed. (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press).
6. •David Kreps. 1990. "Corporate Culture and Economic Theory." In Perspectives on Positive Political Economy ed. J. Alt and K. Shepsle. Cambridge University Press.
7. •Paul Milgrom, Douglass North, and Barry Weingast. 1990. "The Role of Institutions in the Revival of Trade" Economics and Politics 2:1-23.
8. •Douglass North and Barry Weingast. 1996. "Constitutions and Commitment: The Evolution of Institutions Governing Public Choice in Seventeenth-Century England," in

- Alston et al. (eds.). Empirical Studies in Institutional Change. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
9. •Michael Taylor. 1987. The Possibility of Cooperation. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
 10. •Barry Weingast. 1997. "The Political Foundations of Democracy and the Rule of Law," American Political Science Review 91:245-63.

WEEK 15 (11/24): CRITIQUES OF RATIONAL CHOICE THEORY

1. [1. Donald Green and Ian Shapiro. 1994. Pathologies of Rational Choice Theory. Yale University Press. \[Chapters 1-3,6\].](#)
2. [2. James Johnson. 1996. "How Not To Criticize Rational Choice Theory: The Pathologies of Commonsense," Philosophy of the Social Sciences 26:77-91.](#)
3. [3. Gary Cox. 1999. "The Empirical Content of Rational Choice Theory: A Reply to Green and Shapiro." Journal of Theoretical Politics 11:147-69.](#)

Recommended:

1. •[Charles Cameron and Rebecca Morton. 2002. "Formal Theory Meets Data," in Katznelson and Milner \(eds.\) Political Science: State of the Discipline. New York: W.W. Norton.](#) Special issue of Critical Review on Green and Shapiro, Vol. 9, 1995
2. •Bernard Grofman. 1993. "Is turnout the paradox that ate rational choice theory?" In Bernard Grofman ed. Information, Participation, and Choice. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press.
3. •James Johnson. 1997. "Symbol and Strategy in Comparative Political Analysis," APSA-CP: Newsletter of the APSA Organized Section in Comparative Politics (Summer).
4. •Daniel Little. 1991. "Rational Choice Models and Asian Studies," The Journal of Asian Studies 50:35-52.

WEEK 16 (12/1): ALTERNATIVES TO RATIONAL CHOICE: BOUNDED RATIONALITY, PROSPECT THEORY, AND EVOLUTIONARY PSYCHOLOGY

1. [Herbert Simon. 1955. "A Behavioral Model of Rational Choice." Quarterly Journal of Economics 69: 99-118.](#)
2. [Daniel Kahneman and Amos Tversky. 1979. "Prospect Theory: An Analysis of Decision under Risk." Econometrica 47: 263-291.](#)
3. [Robert Frank. 1993. "The Strategic Role of the Emotions." Rationality and Society 5:160-184.](#)
4. [Leda Cosmides and John Tooby. 1994. "Better than Rational: Evolutionary Psychology and the Invisible Hand." American Economic Review 84: 327-332.](#)

Recommended:

1. •Christopher Badcock. 2000. Evolutionary Psychology: A Critical Introduction. New York: Polity Press.
2. •Jerome Barkow, Leda Cosmides and John Tooby (eds.). 1995. The Adapted Mind: Evolutionary Psychology and the Generation of Culture. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
3. •Randy Calvert. 1985. "The Value of Biased Information: A Rational Choice Model of Political Advice." Journal of Politics 47: 530-555.
4. •Jon Elster (ed.). 1986. Rational Choice. Oxford: Basil Blackwell.
5. •Robert Frank. 1988. Passions Within Reason: The Strategic Role of the Emotions. New York: Norton.
6. •Ariel Rubinstein. 1998. Modeling Bounded Rationality. Cambridge: MIT Press.
7. •Herbert Simon. 1990. "Alternative Visions of Rationality." In Paul Moser (ed.) Rationality in Action. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.